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Consumer wallets have more means of payment yet cash still is used most. We develop a
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card with an option to withdraw cash beforehand. The model is estimated with transaction-
level data from a daily consumer payment diary and reveals that utility from payment
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are about $50 and jointly determined with the share of cash payments. Eliminating either
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A popular advertising campaign for a U.S. bank asks, What's in your wallet? For years
the answer was cash and checks, plus maybe one credit card for high-income consumers.
Today, U.S. consumer wallets are thick and diverse following a quarter-century trans-
formation of payments from paper to cards and electronic means of payment.1 Most
consumers have ve or six types of payment instruments; the average wallet holds nearly
a dozen (two per type). Now, three-fourths of consumers have at least one credit card
and the average consumer has 3-1/2. The average (median) wallet still has $70 ($30) of
cash despite ardent eorts to eliminate it. For reasons not fully understood, consumers
have adopted new instruments without discarding older ones.2 And there is no represen-
tative walletmore than 100 unique portfolios of instruments exist. Only one in seven
consumers holds the most popular combination of cash, check, debit card, credit card,
and two types of electronic bank payments.
One possible reason for thicker wallets is heterogeneous utility from payment ser-
vices and no instrument emerging as one size ts all. U.S. consumers make about
three-quarters of their payments (volume, not value) with cash, debit cards, and credit
cards, mainly for retail and other low-value payments; consumers often turn to electronic
instruments for bills and other higher-value payments (see Greene and Schuh 2017). Some
consumers rely heavily on one type of payment card (debit, credit, or prepaid) for their
card payments, a practice called single-homing by Rysman (2007) and Shy (2013). But
scant few consumers single-home for all payments, and even less report never using cash
(see Briglevics, Schuh, and Zhang 2016). Klee (2008) found that instrument choices are
correlated with the dollar values of paymentscash for low values and debit or credit
cards for higher values. Non-acceptance of payment instruments occurs, but it is too
rare to explain the U.S. diversity choices. However, using new data from the Diary of
Consumer Payment Choice (DCPC), we nd the probability of cash use is roughly con-
1This transformation is being measured by the Federal Reserve Payment Study and the Survey and
Diary of Consumer Payment Choice from the Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta. Unless noted otherwise,
statistics cited in this paper are from Greene, Schuh, and Stavins (2016) and Greene and Schuh (2016).
2The exception is checks, which most consumers still have but are using less often. See Gerdes and
Walton (2002), Benton et al. (2007), Schuh and Stavins (2010), and Gerdes et al. (2019).
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stant around 50 percent for most payments (i.e., less than $100) when consumers have
sucient cash in their wallets at the point of sale. Hence, the negative correlation be-
tween the probability of choosing cash and payment values depends on consumers' cash
management policies. Thus, analyzing payment choices independently of cash holdings
may lead to incorrect inferences about consumers' preferences for payment services.
Theoretical models generally have not kept pace with the remarkable scope of trans-
formation in money and payments because two strands of literature have not been fully
connected. One strand is the demand for money, where prototypical models of cash in-
ventory management are Alvarez and Lippi (2009, 2017).3 This research includes a few
means of paymentcash, debit cards, and credit cardsbut the adoption, characteristics,
and suitability for expenditure of payment instruments are not central to the problem.
Instead, these models impose a priori temporal orderings on the use of assets and lia-
bilities, which are not consistent with transactions-level data. The other strand is the
demand for payment instruments, where a protoypical model is Koulayev et al. (2016).4
This research examines a wide range of payment instruments, modeling their adoption
and use based on a rich array of instrument characteristics and payment conditions, in-
cluding dollar value, that yield utility and inuence endogenous choices at the point of
sale. However, these models tend to be static, ignore cash inventory management, and
abstract from consumption-saving and portfolio allocation decisions that are central to
monetary models.
To better understand simultaneous demand for money and payments, we propose a
dynamic optimizing model of consumers making daily cash management and payment
choices that blends the theoretical approaches in the two literatures. As in monetary
models, consumers manage cash inventories to fund current and future payments.5 As
in payments models, agents endogenously choose an instrument for each transaction to
3Other research examining money demand with an option for credit payments includes Telyukova
(2013), Briglevics and Schuh (2013), Fulford and Schuh (2017), and Alvarez and Argente (2019).
4Other research examining payment choice includes Schuh and Stavins (2010), Wakamori and Welte
(2017) and Hunyh, Nicholls, and Shcherbakov (2019).
5Limited data availability prevents the inclusion of similar management tasks for other liquid assets
and liabilities, such as checking accounts and credit card accounts. The potential benets of doing so
are illustrated in Samphantharak, Schuh, and Townsend (2018).
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maximize utility from payment services. This way the model can replicate empirically ob-
served orderings and substitution patterns among instruments across transaction values,
and provide a framework for evaluating the relative importance of cash management costs
and utility from payment services for consumer welfare.
The model is estimated with transactions-level longitudinal micro data that tracks
each consumer payment and cash management decision. The data are from the DCPC,
the U.S. version of daily diary surveys developed by central banks and other researchers
to record consumer cash management and payment activity in industrial countries docu-
mented in Bagnall et al. (2016). In addition to capturing the richness of cash management
and payment choices, diary surveys have less error than recall-based survey data used in
previous research, and diaries provide relatively accurate estimates of aggregate consumer
expenditures (see Schuh (2018)). Although the theoretical model does not yield closed-
form solutions, its structural parameters can be estimated using the method described in
Bajari, Benkard, and Levin (2007).
The estimated model reveals important insights that extend the cash demand and
payment choice literatures. Two key conclusions emerge. First, the estimated model pro-
vides statistically and economically signicant evidence that consumers jointly determine
cash demand and payment choice, so models that focus on just one of these decisions
are incomplete. Second, the estimated model reveals that utility gains from payment
choices are about an order of magnitude larger than losses from cash management costs.
In retrospect, the latter nding should not be surprising. The average U.S. consumer
only makes ve cash withdrawals per month but 59 payments, so opportunities to reap
utility from optimal payment choices exceed the incidence of costs in managing cash.
Cash management in the estimated model is qualitatively similar to existing models
with xed or exogenous cash payments but now exhibits uctuations in the share of
cash payments due substitution among instruments. This feature leads to changes in the
utility derived from payment services that are of comparable magnitude to changes in cash
withdrawal or holding costs. Thus, the monetary literature's focus on cash managment
costs misses an important source of consumer welfare derived from the functioning of the
3
payment system.
Likewise, payments in the estimated model are qualitatively similar to existing mod-
els without cash management but instrument choice probabilities now depend on cash
holdings and the random costs of withdrawals. The probability of cash use declines much
faster with payment value when cash holdings are smaller because consumers try to post-
pone withdrawals until a favorable opportunity is available. Conversely, consumers with
very large amounts of cash in their wallets are much more likely to use cash. We estimate
the optimal cash holdings to be around $50, so consumers with larger cash stocks will
want to spend cash. Alvarez and Lippi (2017) describe this phenomenon as cash burns
in a model where cash is assumed to be used rst; our model exhibits this behavior when
consumers are not constrained to order their use of assets and liabilities and consumers
make optimal dynamic choices.
Finally, the structural model enables us to run counterfactual simulations of restric-
tions on payment choices at the point of sale. Most notably, decreases in utility stemming
from eliminating (or not accepting) a single payment instrument are notably larger than
changes in utility associated with changes in cash management costs. As a practical mat-
ter, cash still contributes signicantly to consumer welfare despite criticisms and calls
for its removal by Rogo (2016) and others. However, eliminating both debit and credit
cards would reduce utility by almost an order of magnitude more than any single in-
strument, reecting the large value of technological innovations embodied in electronic
card networks. These ndings likely have implications for the operation of monetary and
payment systems, and the public policies governing them.
2 Literature Review
This section provides a brief but overview of two literatures, monetary and payments,
that are inherently related but remain largely disconnected. This paper is part of an
emerging research program that is attempting to more fully integrate them.
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2.1 Demand for Money and credit
Modeling money demand as the optimal solution of an inventory management problem
has a long tradition in monetary economics starting with Allais (1947) and popularized by
Baumol (1952) and Tobin (1956). The core objective of this problem, the minimization
of opportunity and transactions costs, remains central to the current literature. Changes
in transactions costs are most often specied as improvements in withdrawal technologies
such as ATMs (for examples, see Lippi and Secchi 2009; Alvarez and Lippi 2009; Amromin
and Chakravorti 2009). Opportunity costs arise from interest-dierentials between liquid
assets serving as a medium of exchange without bearing interest, like currency, and
interest-bearing assets that cannot be used for payment.
The opportunity cost distinction has been evolving as the number of assets serving as
a medium of exchange and the number bearing interest both have increased over time.
Whitesell (1989) extended the Baumol-Tobin model to allow payments from currency and
debitable (checkable) demand deposits that do not pay interest but have a fee dieren-
tial. The elimination of Regulation Q in the early 1980s permitted interest payments on
demand deposits, but still only about half of consumers have an interest-bearing checking
account. Mulligan and Sala-i-Martin (2000) show that failure to adopt interest-bearing
transaction accounts aects the interest-elasticity of money demand. Subsequent nan-
cial innovations increased the variety of interest-bearing liquid assets available to settle
payments. For example, Ball (2012) and Lucas and Nicolini (2015) argue that money
market deposit accounts (MMDA), which now are used as a medium of exchange, can be
added to transactions balances to mitigate the historical destabilization of M1 velocity.6
Other theoretical approaches to modeling the demand for money go beyond the frame-
work proposed in this paper. One approach is the shopping-time model in which money
balances produce utility by saving time or energy in the shopping process (see McCal-
lum and Goodfriend 1987),which is similar to a money-in-utility function specication.
A related, but deeper, approach is search-theoretic models in the New Monetarist Eco-
nomics (NME) tradition, which motivate demand for cash balances because they facilitate
6Also, Hester (1972) accurately predicted that money velocity would be aected by the introduction
of electronic funds transfers (Automated Clearing House network).
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exchange (see Lagos, Rocheteau, and Wright 2017).
Demand for transactions balances to fund consumer expenditures also includes short-
term (revolving) credit. Sastry (1970), Bar-Ilan (1990), and Alvarez and Lippi (2017) oer
models that allow consumers to pay with credit after they run out of cash. Microecono-
metric studies similar to this paper estimate more stable money demand by controlling
for adoption of credit cards (Reynard 2004; Briglevics and Schuh 2013). Alternatively,
studies like Townsend (1989), Telyukova and Wright (2008) and Telyukova (2013) oer
NME style models in which consumers hold cash balances because they are unable to
buy certain goods using credit. From this line of research, Chiu and Molico (2010) is
closest to our work; their calibrated general equilibrium model features cash withdrawal
decisions resulting from a stochastic dynamic optimization problem.
Models of demand for money and credit often assume a temporal ordering of use
based on a priori beliefs about the relative costs and benetslowest net cost funds
are used rstrather than allowing transaction-specic variation in net benets. Strict
temporal orderings of settlement funds are inconsistent with empirical evidence found in
daily payment diaries where the choice of money or credit varies by transaction.7 NME
models that allow non-acceptance of money or credit by sellers can generate alternating
use of funds in environments where exchange opportunities and outcomes are random.
But payment choices become more systematic when acceptance is universal or agents have
foreknowledge of acceptance and preferences for household nancial decisions, especially
cash management.
Recent research has begun to address the need for transaction-specic endogenous
demand for money and credit that may vary across types of consumers. For example,
(Nosal and Rocheteau 2011, chapter 8) presents a tractable model in which consumers
endogenously choose between credit and cash and can reset their cash holdings at a xed
cost. Fulford and Schuh (2017) build a model with endogenous payment choices that
embodies the relative net benets of money and credit and links them to consumption
expenditures and debt accumulation. Following the model of Duca and Whitesell (1995),
7Table 1 in Huynh, Schmidt-Dengler, and Stix (2014) details the predictions of some models that are
not borne out in Canadian and Austrian data.
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Briglevics and Schuh (2013) nd microeconomic evidence that demand for currency is less
interest sensitive for credit card revolvers with high-interest debt than for convenience
users who pay no interest on their credit card use.
In general, the monetary literature has abstracted from details about the choice of
instrument used to authorize payment. Tobin (2008) dened payment instruments as
derivative media linked to monetary assets (currency, demand deposits, etc.) and to
liabilities (such as credit card limits). For currency, the instrument and asset are the
same, but multiple instruments can be used to access demand deposits (checks, debit
cards, prepaid cards, and online banking payments). Prescott and Weinberg (2003) show
that non-pecuniary characteristics of payment instruments, such as communication and
commitment, also can be important determinants of their use. This decision has become
more complex as payment instruments once limited to demand deposits now can be used
to make payments directly from more favorable liquid assets, like MMDAs, or from liquid
liabilities, like a home equity line of credit (HELOC). And, of course, not all credit cards
are alike in terms of their fees, rewards and rates paid to revolve balancesprompting
a bank to ask which card is in our wallets. Thus, studying payment choices jointly with
demand for money and credit may expand our ability to understand and explain the
payments transformation and nancial innovations in assets and liabilities.8
2.2 Demand for Payments
A key segment of the payments literature is modeling consumer demand for instruments
to authorize retail payments.9 An early innovation is Stavins (2001), which investigated
slow adoption of electronic payments methods by heterogeneous consumers using the
8The advent of new technologies such as e-money and mobile payments also may have similar impli-
cations. Recent technology has even altered the concept of money itself, with Bitcoin and M-PESA
(Jack, Suri, and Townsend 2010) serving jointly as an electronic payment network and private money in
the form of "virtual currency." For extended denitions and discussions of e-money, see ECB (2012,
2015) and Committee on Payments and Market Infrastructure and Markets Committee (2018).
9Research on supply of payment servicesprovision of payment networks and the acceptance of
payment instruments by merchantsalso is important in general equilibrium. Humphrey, Kim, and
Vale (2001) argue that adoption of electronic methods lowers the social costs of payment systems. See
Hunyh, Nicholls, and Shcherbakov (2019) for an estimated model of merchant acceptance. We exclude
this part of the literature because it goes beyond the scope of our partial equilibrium consumer model,
and because acceptance is not measured well in the DCPC.
7
limited data on payments in the Survey of Consumer Finances. Subsequent research
by Borzekowski, Kiser, and Ahmed (2008) and Schuh and Stavins (2010), as well as
references therein, also modeled the use of payment instruments (number of payments)
as a function of technology and instrument-specic characteristics like cost, convenience,
security, and record-keeping using better-suited recall-based survey data. This research
relies on two-step discrete-continuous models of adoption and use of individual payment
instruments. Koulayev et al. (2016) extended this approach by simultaneously modeling
adoption of a bundle of instruments (the wallet), and including random utility from the
use of payment instruments in various payment contexts. This model focuses primarily
on costs and benets of instruments used to make heterogeneous payments by a cross-
section of consumers, but abstracts from consumer demand for money and credit needed
to settle payments.
An alternative approach is to model consumer demand for payments at the point of
sale (POS) over time. Starting with Klee (2008), and followed by Cohen and Rysman
(2013) and Wang and Wolman (2016), researchers used scanner data from retail stores
to document instrument choices at checkout to estimate multinomial logit models. These
studies found notable correlation between the dollar values of individual transactions and
the choice of payment instruments, with cash being far more likely to be used for payments
of small dollar values.10 This result added a new perspective unavailable from survey
data, which generally do not contain individual payments or dollar values. However,
except for Cohen and Rysman (2013), scanner data do not provide information about
the demographics of each consumer, their options at the time of payment (cash in their
wallet or instrument adoption), or the longitudinal behavior of individual consumers. In
particular, scanner data do not reveal single-homing behavior by individual consumers
(see Rysman 2007; Shy 2013), which (Briglevics, Schuh, and Zhang 2016) show is obscured
by the aggregate correlation between payment values and instrument choices across all
consumers.
10Arango, Hogg, and Lee (2015), Eschelbach and Schmidt (2013), Briglevics and Schuh (2014), and
Huynh, Schmidt-Dengler, and Stix (2014) also provide evidence that cash holdings are correlated with
payment instrument choices.
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Shortcomings of recall-based surveys and scanner data motivated development of daily
consumer payment diaries used in the cross-country study by Bagnall et al. (2016). In real
time, payment diaries track the dollar value of each transaction, the payment instrument
used, and information about the consumer and merchant involved in each payment.11
Recent research uses payment diary data to estimate POS choice probability models for
various countries and non-retail transactions.12 Wakamori and Welte (2017) extended
this research using the Canadian data to estimate a random coecients model where
not all respondents switch from cash to a debit or credit card at the same transaction
value. They found the dominance of cash for low-value transactions is primarily driven
by consumer preferences for cash. A limitation of econometric models applied to diary
data thus far is they are not derived from a dynamic optimizing framework for consumers'
joint payment and cash management choices that provides cash-ow accounting of money
holdings (stock) and payments, withdrawals, and deposits (ows).
2.3 Joint demand for money, credit, and payments
The unique role of payment instruments oers the potential to better connect demand for
money and credit, on one had, with the demand for specic consumer expenditures. An
early example is Prescott (1987), which enhances cash-in-advance constraints by jointly
modeling the choice of payment instruments (currency and interest-bearing bank drafts).
Fulford and Schuh (2017) jointly models credit card spending, revolving debt, and pay-
ments settled with money over the life-cycle. Alvarez and Argente (2019) models the
cash-credit card tradeo for consumers paying for Uber rides. And Stokey (2019) devel-
ops an extensive general equilibrium model that includes banks and a monetary authority
to assess the macroeconomic impact of payment choices. In each case, however, the mod-
els only determine the aggregate shares of expenditures and funding paid for with each
11Cohen and Rysman (2013) resolved the scanner data anonymity problem by surveying participating
consumers and asking them to re-scan their products. This strategy produces data similar to a payment
diary but requires ex post recall of real-time POS conditions.
12See Fung, Huynh, and Sabetti (2012) and Arango, Hogg, and Lee (2015) for Canada; van der Cruijsen,
Hernandez, and Jonker (2015) for The Netherlands; Bounie and Bouhdaoui (2012) for France; von
Kalckreuth, Schmidt, and Stix (2009) and Eschelbach and Schmidt (2013) for Germany, and Briglevics
and Schuh (2014) for the United States.
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instrument type during a period of time, not the choice of payment instrument and
settlement funds for individual payment opportunities.
The model proposed in this paper models each sequential payment choice for indi-
vidual consumer expenditures while tracking consumer cash management and the cor-
responding cash-ow for currency. To our knowledge, this is the rst attempt to use
longitudinal panel data with individual transactions from payment diaries to estimate a
dynamic optimizing model that jointly explains consumer payment instrument use and
cash management linked by the accounting cash-ow identity at the transaction level.
Samphantharak, Schuh, and Townsend (2018) illustrate the empirical potential of this
approach using the 2012 DCPC data to demonstrate how household nancial statements
can track exact cash-ows connecting the payment instrument used to authorize a specic
consumer expenditure directly to the monetary asset or credit liability (balance sheet)
used to settle the exchange.
3 Data
This section provides a brief overview of the primary data sources for this paper, the
2012 Diary of Consumer Payment Choice (DCPC) and corresponding 2012 Survey of
Consumer Payment Choice. More details can be found in Schuh (2018) and Appendix B.
The SCPC and DCPC are complementary surveys that measure detailed payment
choices and cash management of U.S. consumers. SCPC respondents complete an on-
line survey and recall from memory their adoption of nancial acccounts and payment
instruments, cash management, and (not used in this paper) frequency of use of payment
instruments. DCPC respondents record their payment transactions and cash manage-
ment for three consecutive days. We use SCPC consumer data on adoption of accounts
and payment instruments plus DCPC transactions data on: 1) payment values, instru-
ment used, location, and type; 2) cash holdings, deposits, and withdrawals by location;
and 3) time of day.
DCPC data are a balanced longitudinal panel of a representative sample of about
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2,500 U.S. consumers during October 1-31, 2012. Respondents were selected from the
RAND American Life Panel to match the population of U.S. adults (ages 18 years and
older). After completing their SCPC, respondents were assigned to complete their DCPC
on randomly selected days throughout the month so panel entry and exit is deterministic
and xed. This diary design produces representative samples for each day of the month
as well as for the entire month.
The DCPC panel data mimic the transaction records of monthly statements for check-
ing and credit card accounts. Thus, they are essentially the same as transactions data
from nancial institutions provided by the kinds of personal nancial management (PFM)
services and applications used by Baker (2018), Pagel and Olafsson (2018), and Gelman
et al. (2018). Data from nancial institutions may have less measurement and reporting
error than consumer diary data, but the DCPC data are superior in other respects. For
example, the DCPC tracks what consumers do with cash withdrawn from banks, not
just how much they withdrew. The DCPC also collects additional relevant information
at the time of transaction, such as cash held in wallet. And, importantly, the DCPC
data are based on sampling and implementation methods that are designed to produce
representative samples of U.S. consumers whereas PFM data are not.
We restrict the sample for model estimation to in-person POS transactions, includ-
ing person-to-person (P2P) payments, by consumers who had both a debit card (hence
checking account) and credit card. The restricted sample represents the bulk of cash
use because online payments don't accept cash and few bill payments are made with
cash. Wallet restrictions are made to sidestep the theoretical complication of modeling
adoption; in practice, respondents are unlikely to adopt or discard payment cards during
the three diary days. The restricted sample accounts for 62 percent of POS transactions
and 57 percent of respondents, who are not quite representative of the U.S. population.
However, payment card adopters rely on cash relatively less than other consumers, so our
results likely serve as a lower bound on the usefulness of cash.
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4 Empirical Evidence
This section provides evidence on consumer payment choices and cash management to
motivate the model and enhance understanding of the estimation results.13
4.1 Payment Adoption and Use
The rst two panels of Table 1 report statistics on consumer adoption and use of payment
instruments for the DCPC (full sample) and sub-sample used in estimation (estimation
sample). In the full sample, all respondents adopted cash, 78 percent had a debit card,
69 percent had a credit card, 57 percent had both payment cards, and only 10 percent had
neither card.14 In the estimation sample, respondents have all three payment instruments
by construction. Despite thicker consumer wallets, cash is still king at the point of sale.
In the full sample, cash accounted for half (51 percent) of POS payments by volume
(number of transactions). Even in the estimation sample, where respondents have both
payment cards, cash accounted for a higher share (44 percent) than either debit cards
(31 percent) or credit cards (24 percent). Thus, the estimation subsample understates
the full use and value of cash.
Ching and Hayashi (2010) showed that consumer use of payment cards can be inu-
enced by monetary incentives, such as cash back or airline mileage, that entice consumers
to use payment cards more often. Convenience users who pay o their credit card
charges in full each month receive the full benet of rewards, but revolvers who carry
high-interest unpaid balances on their cards have an osetting cost. Table 2 shows con-
sumer payment choices broken down by credit card use (convenience or revolving) and
type (with rewards or not) in the estimation sample. Not surprisingly, consumers with a
rewards card are more likely to pay with a credit cardconvenience users are nearly twice
as likely (40.0 versus 23.1 percent), and revolvers more than three times (19.6 versus 5.8).
13Reported sample moments are unweighted because the structural model is estimated without weights.
The DCPC data are collected using stratied random sampling, so weighted sample means are required
to estimate population moments for all U.S. consumers, which can be found in Schuh and Stavins (2014)
and Greene, Schuh, and Stavins (2018).
14The weighted population estimates are quite similar: 100 percent for cash, 79 for debit card, and




Adoption rates (share of respondents)
Cash 1.00 1.00
Debit card .78 1.00
Credit card .69 1.00
Debit and credit card .57 1.00
Neither debit nor credit card .10 0.00




Transactions at POS with cash, debit, credit (#)
Total 10,822 6,707
When CIA binds 2,803 2,044
When m < $2 1,206 850
Values at POS with cash, debit, credit ($)
Median 12.60 13.41
Average 27.99 29.66
Standard deviation 66.66 73.89
NOTE: The number of respondents is 2,468 in the full DCPC sample
and 1,272 in the estimation sample.
Table 1: Payment instruments and transactions, 2012
Number of Percentage of transactions (%)
Credit card type transactions Cash Debit Credit Preceded by
withdrawals
Convenience users
Rewards 1,661 42.6 17.5 40.0 7.5
No rewards 2,582 42.6 34.3 23.1 9.3
Revolvers
Rewards 1,860 46.0 34.4 19.6 8.3
No rewards 604 47.9 46.4 5.8 9.1
All types 6,707 44.0 31.2 24.8 8.5
Table 2: Payment choices by credit card type, 2012
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However, adoption of a rewards card has little eect on cash activity because higher
credit card use is largely oset by lower debit card use. Table 2 shows that revolvers
use cash 3-5 percentage points more often than convenience users, but cash shares are
essentially the same for consumers with and without rewards. Although rewards card
holders are less likely to withdraw cash before a transaction, the dierences are less than
2 percentage points.15 These results are fortuitous because the DCPC data do not track
whether specic card payments were made with a rewards card or not. Therefore, the
model and estimation can focus on cash management without specifying separate decision
rules for dierent types of debit and credit card adopters and users.
4.2 Transactions
The remaining two panels of Table 1 report statistics on the volume and values of
transactions for which consumers made payments. Nearly 11,000 POS transactions are
recorded in the diary. The estimation sample includes 57 percent of all DCPC respon-
dents who account for a slightly disproportionate amount of payments at 62 percent
(∼ 6, 707/10, 822). For close to one-third of transactions (∼ 2, 044/6, 707), cash is not an
option because the consumer does not have enough in their wallet to fund the payment
and hence the cash-in-advance (CIA) constraint is binding. For almost one in eight
transactions (∼ 850/6, 707), consumers have essentially no cash in their wallet (< $2).
Table 1 also reveals that most POS transactions are relatively low-value. The median
consumer payment was $13, so half of all recorded POS transaction values do not require
consumers to hold large amounts of cash. Some merchants impose minimum values
(typically $10) for credit card transactions, which also helps cash to compare favorably.
Even the average transaction value was only slightly more than double the median (about
$30) despite large variation (standard deviations). However, the left panel of Figure 1
shows that the full distribution of POS transaction values is skewed to the right by much
larger amounts, even after excluding bill payments.
rather than assumed. It is dened as having or using cash at some point during the year.
15Using SCPC data, Briglevics and Schuh (2013) found no eect of credit card rewards or debt on
average cash holdings but showed that cash demand of revolvers is less interest sensitive than cash
demand of convenience users.
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Figure 1: Distribution of POS transaction values (left) and payment probabilities (right)
As noted in Section 2, transaction values are good predictors of the payment instruments
consumers choose. Following the literature, we estimated a multinomial logit model of
payment choice and plot the unconditional probabilities of each instrument as a function
of transaction value in the right panel of Figure 1. Like the scanner data, DCPC data
reect a negative correlation between cash use and transaction values. Payment cards are
used more often for larger values, with debit cards slightly higher than credit.16 These
payment choice probabilities are central to estimation of the structural model, which adds
controls for consumer-level cash management.
To preview later results showing the sensitivity of cash use to cash holdings, the
right panel of Figure 1 also includes the estimated probability of cash use for the subset
of transactions that were unconstrained by the amount of cash in their wallets (dotted
black line).17 When consumers had enough cash to pay for their next transaction in full
16The modest dominance of debit diers from prior estimates using retail-store scanner data that
showed credit more common than debit. The reason is that scanner data combines signature debit and
credit card payments, which run on the same networks, and could not be identied separately due to
technical limitations. Instead, the DCPC measures signature and PIN debit card payments separately,
so debit and credit use are identied accurately.
17The multinomial logit of payment choice simply adds an indicator variable for a binding CIA con-
straint to the variables in the utility functions (a constant, an indicator variable for transaction values
under $10, and a linear term in the transaction value).
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with cash, the probability of using cash was remarkably stable at just under 50 percent
for transaction values up to $100. Thus, the overall negative correlation between cash use
and transaction values, observed in the data and noted in the literature, appears to be
explained by cash holding behavior. Indirectly, however, the occurrence of payment values
that exceed the amount of cash held in wallet reects consumers' endogenous decision to
forego a cash withdrawals that would have removed their cash-in-advance constraint. Our
main contribution is to build and estimate a model that can assess whether reluctance
to withdraw cash primarily reects the costs of cash management or consumers' inherent
preferences for using cash to pay for transactions, especially those with low value.
4.3 Cash Management
Table 3 reports statistics on cash holdings and withdrawals. In addition to providing
context for model estimation, these statistics suggest how well cash demand models in
prior research could explain the DCPC data.
4.3.1 Cash holdings
Most consumers hold low amounts of cash, but some hold relatively large amounts (rst
two panels of Table 3). The median consumer in the estimation sample only has $20
stored at home (rst panel) compared with $36 in the median consumer's wallet before
a transaction (second panel). However, average cash held at home is $202, whereas the
average held in a wallet is only $76. Thus, while most consumers would require a cash
withdrawal to pay for a large-value transaction, some have a large stash of cash they
can tap to replenish their cash-in-wallet holdings.18 The average cash in a wallet can
fund 2-1/2 average-sized transactions (∼ 75.57/29.66) and 6 median-sized transactions
(∼ 75.57/12.60), but median cash in wallet can fund less than 2 median transactions
(∼ 20/13).
18As explained in Appendix B, these cash-at-home stocks are used to handle cases where the cash-ow
identity does not hold. We construct an articial withdrawal category (not reported in the diary) called




Cash held at home* ($)
Median 20.00 20.00
Average 234.23 202.02
Standard deviation 583.15 466.62
Cash in wallet
Before POS transaction ($)
Median 40.00 36.00
Average 80.98 75.57
Standard deviation 145.40 130.58
Before card transactions (ratio)***
Median debit card .61 .61
Median credit card 1.37 1.10
Average debit card 3.68 3.62




Standard deviation 107.63 114.10
Cash withdrawals**
Number (#) 1,024 573
Median amount ($) 40.00 40.00
Average amount ($) 81.30 77.27
NOTES: *Excludes observations above $5,000. **Excludes observations
above $1,100. Outliers are excluded because they signicantly inuence
estimated moments. ***Value of cash in wallet relative to value of
the current card transaction.
Table 3: Cash holdings and withdrawals, 2012
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4.3.2 Payments and cash holdings
Although most consumers have non-trivial amounts of cash in their wallets, many pay
with a debit or credit card instead of using their available cash. The third panel of Table 3
quanties this fact by reporting the ratios of cash in wallet to the value of the next card
payment; ratios of 1.0 or greater indicate transactions where the CIA constraint was not
binding and vice versa for ratios below 1.0. For most credit card payments, the CIA
constraint was not binding (median ratio > 1.0), but for most debit card payments it
was (ratio of .61). The average ratios of cash to debit and cash to credit payment values
are much higher (3.62 and 4.77, respectively), which indicates that even consumers with
very large amounts of cash in their wallets still make card payments for some reason.
The relationship between cash-in-wallet and POS transaction values (including card
payments) appears in their joint distribution depicted in Figure 2. Both axes are in
logs and the transaction value axis is inverted; the heat map denotes the number of
transactions. The diagonal between the northwest corner (low transaction values and cash
holdings) and southeast corner (high transaction values and cash holdings) demarcates
the feasible region for cash payments. Above the diagonal, consumers held sucient cash
to pay for the transaction; below the diagonal, consumers faced a CIA constraint and
paid with a card. The key fact in Figure 2 is that most transactions occurred when the
CIA constraint was not binding. A non-trivial mass of transactions also exists where
consumers had very low cash balances (orange-yellow region along the left vertical axis)
and thus had to use a payment card.
Narrowing the focus to cash payments only, Figure 3 displays the shares of cash
payments for combinations of transaction values and cash on hand. The at portion of
the oor is the infeasible region where the CIA constraint binds. Two important facts are
evident. First, cash shares generally decline as transaction values increase for essentially
all levels of cash on hand but bottom out at around 0.4, even for large transactions by
consumers with enough cash in their wallet (see also right side of Figure 1). Second, the
cash share for each transaction value increases slightly with the level of cash on hand.
This nding is consistent with consumers worrying about running out of cash and trying
18


































Figure 2: Joint distribution of POS transaction values and cash holdings
to conserve their holdings.
Overall, this subsection provides evidence against the hypothesis that consumers
follow a lexicographic ordering of payment instrument choices across their sequential
transactions. Consumers make card payments under a variety of cash holding condi-
tions, and vice versa, so models that assume ordering of assets and liabilities (hence
payment instrument choices) miss a salient feature of the data. To t the data, models
of cash demand must introduce structure to motivate dierent payment choices for each
transaction and amount of cash holding. The model in the next section does this by
introducing instrument-specic random utility that varies across payment opportunities
and transaction values.
4.3.3 Withdrawals
The last two panels of Table 3 report cash withdrawals and their relation to cash holdings.
Unlike transactions, consumer withdrawals are relatively rare. The estimation sample
contains only 573 withdrawals for October 2012, an average of less than one per month
(.45) per consumer. In the estimation sample, the median cash withdrawal was $40 and
the average withdrawal amount was almost twice as much ($77). Figure 4 shows that the
full distribution of withdrawal amounts is not smooth. The global mode is $20 and local
















Cash on hand (log−scale)Transaction value (log−scale)
Figure 3: Shares of POS cash transactions
More than one in ve withdrawals is less than $20.
An important feature of these withdrawal data is the heterogeneity of locations shown,
in Table 4. ATMs are most common, but obtaining cash from family and friends or from
the beginning-of-day adjustment are tied for the second most frequent. These three
locations account for nearly two-thirds of all withdrawals, while the remaining third
represent a diverse range locations. The average withdrawal amount varies by more than
$100 across locations, which may reect heterogeneity in the cost of withdrawals at each
location. Little evidence is available on the cost of withdrawals by location, but some
(bank teller, check cashing store) may be higher cost than others (ATM or cash back).
Because there are not enough observations to identify withdrawal costs for each location,
our model incorporates this feature with an unobserved random cost.
The penultimate panel of Table 3 shows that most consumers held some cash when
making a withdrawal (median of $11), while some had considerably more (average of $43
compared to average transaction of $30). This nding contrasts with the basic Baumol-
Tobin framework in which withdrawals only occur when cash holdings reach $0, but it is
consistent with the models in Lippi and Secchi (2009) and Alvarez and Lippi (2009) that
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Figure 4: Distribution of withdrawal amounts, 2012
Withdrawal amount ($)
Location Number Average Median 90th percentile
Bank teller 64 156 80 400
ATM 147 103 60 200
Cash back (retail store) 48 31 20 50
Cash refund (retail store) 7 30 21 75
Employer 25 104 70 200
Check cashing store 3 88 68 149
Family or friend 112 44 20 100
Other location 55 53 25 112
Beginning-of-day adjustment 112 60 26 167
Total 573 77 40 200
Table 4: Withdrawals by location, 2012
account for non-zero cash holdings at withdrawal by assuming random free withdrawals.
However, the ratio of cash held before withdrawal ($41-43) to average cash in wallet ($76-
81) is 0.5-0.6, notably higher in the 2012 DCPC than in Alvarez and Lippi (2009) for Italy
(0.4) and the United States (0.3) in the 1980s. Lower interest rates and technological
changes through 2012 may explain at least part of these dierences.
Figure 5 depicts the relationship between withdrawals and transactions by the amount
of cash holdings. Symbols (+ and o) indicate the shares of POS transactions (left scale)
preceded by a withdrawal when the CIA constraint was binding (+) or slack (o). Stacked
bars represent the number of transactions (right scale) used to calculate these shares
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Figure 5: Share of withdrawals by amount of cash holdings
when the CIA constraint was binding or slack. Not surprisingly, consumers are more
likely to make a withdrawal when the CIA constraint is binding. For example, when
cash holdings are $10 or less, cash-constrained consumers make a withdrawal for every
six transactions whereas unconstrained consumers make one for every 16. When cash
holdings reach $40, the eect of the CIA constraint on withdrawals disappears. Very
few consumers with more than $50 face a binding CIA constraint, so the estimates of
pre-transaction withdrawals are erratic in these small samples.
The evidence in this subsection, combined with the evidence in Figure 3 showing cash
is used primarily for small transactions, suggests that short-term cash needs are an im-
portant driver of withdrawals. On the other hand, payment card holders can keep making
purchases long after they run out of cash. These ndings illustrate the simultaneity of
cash management and payment choice, underscoring the importance of jointly modeling
of these consumer decisions.
5 Model
This section describes our model of cash management and payment instrument choice,
which blends and builds on Alvarez and Lippi (2009, 2017) and Koulayev et al. (2016).
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Consumers nance a stream of transactions that have a stochastic value (p). Before each
payment, consumers may withdraw cash; if so, they pay a stochastic withdrawal cost
(b) and xed holding (opportunity) cost of cash between transactions (R). Then, at the
point of sale, consumers choose cash, debit card, or credit card to make each payment
based on transaction-specic random utility derived from the payment services provided
by the payment instrument chosen.
As noted in Section 2, existing models tend to impose a temporal ordering of cash use
based on a priori assumptions about its cost relative to other means of payment. However,
the evidence in Section 4 shows that consumers do not follow lexicographic ordering of
payment instrument use, suggesting that the utility of payment services varies across
transactions and time. Instead of imposing a priori restrictions on instrument value and
timing, we parameterize the utility functions and estimate them.
Using a random utility framework to model payment instrument choice means that,
unlike traditional inventory management models of cash demand, the withdrawal and
holding costs become parameters of a utility function and are not measured in units of
money or interest rates. While this feature is important when interpreting the econo-
metric estimates later, it nevertheless ts into the literature that usually interprets these
costs broadly. For example, withdrawal costs are usually thought of as including shoe-
leather costs of nding an ATM; holding costs capture the inconvenience associated with
keeping a certain amount of cash in one's wallet, not just foregone interest.19
Currency payments are subject to a CIA constraint. If cash balances are insucient to
settle a transaction, consumers cannot take advantage of high utility opportunities associ-
ated with cash transactions.20. As a result, their expected utility from future transactions
falls as they run out of cash. This change in expected utility is balanced against the costs
19Given that consumers in the estimation sample make 2.3 (2.0) transactions per day on average
(median), the opportunity cost or risk of theft should be small and we interpret holding costs primarily
as the inconvenience" of carrying cash. A generous 2 percent annual rate for checking accounts interest
translates into a 0.00002 (∼ 1.02 12.3∗365 − 1) percent interest rate over the average holding period.
20In reality, debit and credit card payments are subject to funding constraints as well (checking account
balances have a zero minimum and credit card borrowing has an upper limit). Ideally, the model would
incorporate these constraints too, but the DCPC does not provide data on them. However, the CIA
constraint on currency is likely to bind most frequently at the point of sale because some consumers have
overdraft protection on debit cards and some consumers can exceed their credit card limits.
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of acquiring and holding cash associated with cash inventory management. Since the
costs and benets of holding cash accrue over multiple transactions, consumers take
into account current and future costs and utility when making withdrawal and payment
decisions. Importantly, in our blended model consumers can adjust their inows and
outows of cash holdings continually, and thus have an extra margin on which to change
cash holdings compared to other models of cash demand in the literature.
5.1 The dynamic problem
The formal consumer's problem involves nding the optimal withdrawal and payment
choices of a consumer who settles an innite sequence of transactions with stochastic
transaction values, p. Each transaction involves two sequential decisions: (1) a decision
whether to withdraw cash before that transaction, followed by (2) a choice of payment
instrument for that transaction.
Consider rst the problem of choosing a payment instrument for a consumer who
already made her withdrawal decision and holds m dollars of cash in her wallet. She can
choose credit, debit, or cash (provided she has enough) to pay for the current transaction.
Following Koulayev et al. (2016), the model contains a random utility framework where
each payment method yields an indirect utility ow, ui(p) + ε(i), associated with each
instrument i = {c, d, h}. The stochastic part of utility, ε(i), is revealed to the consumer
just before she chooses the payment instrument and captures the random value of each
transaction that depends on payment choice but is unobservable to the econometrician.21
The deterministic part of utility, ui(p), depends only on the current transaction value, p,
which is assumed to be known by the consumer. However, the consumer does not know
future realizations of p or ε(i), only the distributions from which they will be drawn.
At each point-of-sale, the consumer solves the Bellman equation
V (m; p) = max
i∈{c,d,h}
ui(p) + ε(i) + βE [W (m′; p′, b′)] (1)
21Examples of the random value may include non-acceptance of cash or card payments; discounts or
surcharges associated with a payment instrument; unsafe environments where risk of theft is high for
cash or where consumers prefer not to share their card information; and store clerks that are slow at
dealing with cash.
24
where V (m; p) denotes the value of having m dollars of cash before making the cur-
rent p-dollar transaction, and E [W (m′; p′, b′)] denotes the expected continuation value
of reaching the withdrawal decision before the next withdrawal decision with m′ dollars
of cash. E[.] is the mathematical expectation operator taken over the realizations of all
stochastic variables related to the next transaction. The ε(i)'s are assumed to be inde-
pendently and identically distributed Type I extreme value. The law of motion for m is
given by m′ = m − p · I(i = h), where I is an indicator function taking the value of 1
if cash is chosen (i = h) and 0 otherwise. β is used to discount the utility from future
transactions.
Prior to each transaction, the consumer decides whether to withdraw cash by solving
another Bellman equation,
W (m; p, b) = max
m∗≥m
−b · I(m∗ 6= m)−R ·m∗ + E [V (m∗; p)] , (2)
whereW (m; p, b) denotes the value of havingm dollars of cash before making a withdrawal
decision knowing that the next transaction to be nanced is p dollars. The withdrawal
cost, b, is drawn from a uniform distribution on the interval [bL, bU ] before each withdrawal
decision, while the holding cost of each dollar of cash between transactions is xed at R.
The consumer will increase cash holdings fromm tom∗ by making a withdrawal (m∗−m)
if the expected value of having more cash at the next payment choice, E [V (m∗; p)],
exceeds the transaction and opportunity costs of withdrawal. In this case the indicator
function I(m∗ 6= m) will equal 1, otherwise it is 0. A unique feature of this model is that
the endogenous withdrawal decision and amount are time-varying because they depend
on the consumer's upcoming transaction value p and on the expected utility of using cash
for that transaction.
Assuming consumers know the exact value of their next transaction when making
withdrawal decisions is convenient and tractable but admittedly strong. It would be
preferable to introduce uncertainty about transaction values, but there is no feasible way
to infer the magnitude and variation of this uncertainty from the available data. Most of
the time, consumers probably know where they plan to shop, what they will buy, and how
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much they will spend before making a transaction. In reality, consumers may plan spend-
ing for multiple future transactions. In any case, the expected transaction value probably
is not the unconditional mean of p in reality. The conditional expected transaction value
is important because Figure 5 shows that the actual transaction value explains variation
in the likelihood of observing a withdrawal for low cash balances reasonably well.
Our specication of withdrawal costs extends the models of Alvarez and Lippi (2009,
2017) where consumers are randomly oered an opportunity to make free withdrawals,
which would appear as a Bernoulli distributed b. Table 4 showed numerous methods to
obtain cash, which consumers use to varying degrees. Specifying a continuous distribu-
tion for withdrawal costs, b, captures this variation in the data simply. The withdrawal
cost only has rst-order eects on whether consumers make a withdrawal, not how much
they withdraw. Withdrawal amounts would vary even more if holding costs, R, also had
a stochastic component, which would improve the t of our estimated model. Unfortu-
nately, the estimation method cannot handle errors in both b and R.22
5.2 Timing
Following is a summary of the timing structure of the model.
1. Before each transaction, a consumer with m dollars of cash in her wallet has the
option to withdraw cash:
(i) Random transaction value, p, and random withdrawal cost, b, are realized and
observed by the consumer
(ii) Consumer decides how much cash (if any) to withdraw
• If withdrawing, consumer adjusts her holdings to m∗ and incurs xed
withdrawal cost b and cash holding costs R ·m∗
• If not withdrawing, she incurs cash holding costs R ·m
22With an additional shock to R, the one-to-one mapping between the probability of making a with-
drawal (observed in the data) and the percentiles of b (the unobserved structural shock) is broken.
However, this mapping is crucial, as it allows us to link the observed behavior to the unobserved states
of the model when forward-simulating the value functions. See Section 6 and (Ackerberg et al. 2007, ,
page 103) for more details.
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2. After withdrawal decision, the consumer proceeds to the transaction:
(i) Random components of utility for the current transaction, ε(i), are realized
(ii) Payment instrument is chosen, i = {c, d, h}
(iii) Cash on hand decreases by p, if consumer pays with cash
3. Return to step #1.
6 Estimation
To estimate the model, the deterministic part of the utility function for each payment
instrument, ui(p), is parameterized as
ui(p) = γi0 + γ
i
p≤10I(p ≤ 10) + γipp i ∈ {c, d, h},
which includes a constant, γ0, an indicator variable for low-value transactions, I(p ≤ 10),
and a linear term in p. The dummy variable for transactions less than $10 controls for
the eects of potential supply-side constraints where vendors do not accept cards due to
fees or other costs.23 If the cash in advance constraint binds, uh(p) = −∞. The evidence
in Section 4 suggests that γhp < 0 and γ
h
p≤10 > 0. These utility functions introduce
channels for the transaction value to inuence payment choice beyond the eects of cash
management costs (b and R).
In addition to computational ease, this parsimonious specication of utility is war-
ranted for several reasons. First, Cohen and Rysman (2013) provide evidence from a large
U.S. scanner data set that the eect of transaction values on payment instrument choice
are not correlated with demographic variables or even individual xed-eects. Second,
although most prior studies use demographic variables as regressors, demographics tend
to matter more for adoption of payment instruments than for use conditional on adop-
tion, and our estimation is conditional on adoption of payment cards. Finally, we did not
control for card rewards because Section 4.1 showed they had little eect on cash use.
23We chose $10 as the cuto based on U.S. anecdotal evidence and the discrete drop in the probability
of cash use at that transaction value seen in Figures 1 and 3.
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The model is estimated using the methods described in Bajari, Benkard, and Levin
(2007), or BBL, which is an extension of the Hotz and Miller (1993) conditional choice
probability (CCP) estimator used in the empirical IO literature to estimate dynamic
structural models with discrete and continuous variables. This approach diers from the
methodology used in prior studies of cash management or payment instrument choice. In
the monetary literature, dynamic models typically are constructed to yield closed-form
solutions for withdrawal policies that can be matched to data using GMM estimators.
In the payments literature, static models typically are constructed for discrete choices
where the likelihood functions have a closed-form that can be estimated or simulated as
in Koulayev et al. (2016).
Like CCP estimators, the BBL procedure has two steps. The rst-step involves es-
timating reduced-form models for state transitions, which are used to characterize the
expected value function E[W (m; p, b)]. As shown in BBL, the linearity of the utility func-
tions (in structural parameters) and the error specications imply that E[W (m; p, b)] will
be a product of the vector of structural parameters and some basis functions that are
derived from the observed choices and state variables. The basis functions can be re-
covered with forward simulations. In our model, this means: 1) a Pareto-distribution
is estimated for transaction amounts; 2) a nonparametric estimate describes payment
instrument choice; and 3) the observed nonparametric distribution is used to describe
withdrawals. In accordance with Figure 5, separate withdrawal functions are used for
when the CIA constraint is binding and non-binding. These reduced-form policy func-
tions are used to construct estimates of the basis functions of E[W (m; p, b)] at a number of
grid points in the state space. At each grid-point, we drew 10,000 paths of the stochastic
variables with 7,200 transactions for each.24















, are recovered using a simulated method of moments
estimation as in Pakes, Ostrovsky, and Berry (2007), or POB. β is assumed to be xed
at .995. Cash management costs are restricted to be positive (b, bL, bU , R > 0) because
24After about 7,200 transactions, the discount factor falls below machine precision so the present value
of additional transactions is zero.
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they enter equation (2) with negative signs. Using the basis functions from the rst-stage
simulations and a vector of structural parameters θ̂, the model's prediction is computed
for each observation in the sample. As noted in POB, the maximum-likelihood (ML)
estimator is not asymptotically ecient because the second stage uses the simulated
value function (a function of the basis functions from the rst-stage simulations) and
not the true value function. Moreover, the ML estimate of the structural parameters
can be very sensitive to this error if only a few withdrawals are observed in parts of the
state space, resulting in poor small-sample performance. Figure 5 shows this is a realistic
concern in the DCPC data.
In the estimation routine, six moments are simulated and matched to their data
counterparts: the probabilities of withdrawal for low-value (m ≤ $25) and high-value
(m > $25) cash holdings; the probabilities of cash use for low-value (p ≤ 10) and high-
value (p > $10) transactions; the average amount of cash purchases; and the average
amount of cash withdrawn. Separating withdrawal probabilities for low and high values
of cash holdings and transactions is important, as Figure 5 shows these could be quite
dierent. Careful inspection of equation (1) reveals that when the CIA is binding the
continuation value of the two remaining options (debit and credit) is the same since
m′ = m regardless of which payment card is chosen. Therefore, a simple multinomial




p . Because the model only identies utility
dierences and not the absolute level, we normalize utility from choosing a credit card




p = 0). The six moment conditions are used to estimate the six
remaining structural parameters {bL, bU , R, γh0 , γhp≤10, γhp}.
7 Results
The estimated coecients are supportive of the theoretical model, as shown in Table 5.
All estimates are statistically signicant at the 5-percent level or better except the lower
bound on cash withdrawal costs (bL), which is not signicantly dierent from zero. The
cash holding and opportunity cost parameters (bL, bU , and R) are restricted to plausible
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0.0003 7.99 0.0049 2.20 0.79 -0.12 .57 .51 -.0037
(0.08) (1.57) (0.001) (0.43) (0.37) (0.03) (0.13) (0.22) (0.0016)
Table 5: Structural parameter estimates (standard errors)
ranges, but the remaining unrestricted parameters have expected signs and plausible
magnitudes. Relative utility declines with the transaction price for cash (γhp ) and debit
card (γdp) payments, although the latter is close to zero. Even after controlling for the
costs of managing cash, consumers prefer cards for larger transaction values. Cash and
debit card payments less than $10 oer additional relative utility, suggesting that credit
cards have lower acceptance or convenience for small-value payments.
The estimates are parameters of a utility function that do not have natural units and
thus can be hard to interpret beyond signs. For examples, bU , bL and R do not represent
a dollar value or rate of interest, respectively, although R represents units of utility per
dollar by virtue of multiplying cash holdings (m). Thus, the parameter estimates merit
additional interpretation.
7.1 Parameter interpretation
A key result is the distribution of cash withdrawal costs [bL, bU ]. Despite the relatively
wide estimated range, in our simulations consumers never withdraw cash if withdrawal
costs are greater than 4. That is, withdrawals only happen in the most favorable lower
half of the estimated distribution; the average withdrawal cost estimate,
¯̂
b = −0.75,
reveals that consumers time most of their withdrawals strategically. One way to evaluate
the economic magnitude of this relative utility estimate is to compare it with another
estimated parameter of the inventory problem, such as the holding cost (R̂). In that case,








Another way to gauge the size of the withdrawal cost is to compare it with the benet
of a cash withdrawal that gives a consumer the option to pay with cash, which is par-
ticularly valuable for small-value transactions. We measure this benet as the dierence
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between expected instantaneous utility ow for a consumer who makes a transaction of










where the log-sum formula computes the expected utility derived from the payment
choice. This formula abstracts from continuation values and thus reduces the problem to
a multinomial choice model. Comparing this benet to the xed cost of withdrawals, it





About 43 percent of POS payments were $10 or less (see Figure 1), which explains the
popularity of cash even though consumers receive relatively low payment-service utility
from large-value cash transactions.
7.2 Cash holdings and use
Using the estimated model and data on cash holdings, Figure 6 illustrates the eects of
CIA constraints on the probability of cash use by consumers. The four colored line types
in Figure 6 plot the estimated probabilities of cash use for amounts of cash held in wallet
ranging from $25-250. When the CIA binds at the wallet amount, cash probabilities reach
zero for larger transactions. Even with a roughly average amount of cash ($75), consumers
are reluctant to use cash for larger transactions; less than 20 percent of purchases of $30
or more are made with cash. The tradeo changes rapidly with cash holdings; consumers
with $25 make only about one-third of their very small-value transactions with cash and
less than 5 percent of $20 transactions. In contrast, for large cash holdings (e.g., $250),
the probability of cash use is nearly 80 percent and stable up to $80.
The results in Figure 6 relate to other recent research. Eschelbach and Schmidt (2013)
found that cash in wallets after transactions is strongly negatively correlated with the
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Figure 6: Probability of cash use by transaction value and cash holding
probability of cash use. However, cash holding and withdrawals are jointly determined
(see Figure 5), so it is inappropriate to include cash holdings as an explanatory variable
in a multinomial logit model without controlling for the endogeneity. Alvarez and Lippi
(2017) assume credit card payments are more costly than cash payments on the margin
so consumers spend cash as long as they have enough of ita behavior they call cash
burns." Figure 6 shows this behavior arises even in a model where the relative value
of cash payments uctuates across transactions and consumers can substitute payment
cards for cash at each transaction. Thus, consumers with $75 of cash and above are more
likely (greater than 50 percent) to use cash for transactions under $20 than consumers
without a binding CIA constraint (see right panel of Figure 1, black dotted line).
The cash-burn result also is illustrated with the estimated model in Figure 7. To
minimize withdrawal costs, consumers defer withdrawals and run down cash inventories
until a favorable withdrawal opportunity arises, represented by low value of random cost
b ∈ [bL, bU ]. The intuition underlying this behavior appears in the continuation value,
E [W (m′; p′)], plotted in the left panel of Figure 7 for each amount of cash held after
a point of sale was made (and before the next holding cost shock and transaction value
are realized). The continuation value is hump-shaped with a maximum just below $50.
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Figure 7: Expected continuation values before holding cost shocks and transaction values
are drawn (left); shadow value of an additional dollar in cash (right)
Consumers gladly make cash payments that decrease their holdings to around $50 but
tend to avoid cash purchases that reduce their holdings below $50.
The shadow value of cash, shown in the right panel of Figure 7, is the marginal
utility an extra unit of cash provides by relaxing the CIA constraint for current or future
transactions. We compute the shadow value as the dierence between the expected
continuation values (before p and b are known) of holding m+ 1 and m dollars of cash,
λ(m) = E[W (m+ 1; p, b)]− E[W (m; p, b)],
where the expectation is taken over the realizations of p and b. The plotted shadow value
(right panel) is the derivative of the continuation value (left panel) measured relative to
the average cost of withdrawals (
¯̂
b = .75) for dierent values of m. The shadow value rises
rapidly as cash falls below $50, reaching about 40 percent of the average withdrawal cost
when cash is depleted. But when cash rises above $50 the shadow value turns negative
and declines steadily because consumers are made worse o with more cash. Although
having more cash relaxes the likelihood of a binding CIA constraint, consumers with more
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than $50 in their wallet are not particularly worried about the constraint because most
transactions are low value.
7.3 Consumer welfare
The welfare cost of ination is a central concern in the monetary literature. Bailey
(1956) measured the welfare cost of ination in a static model with zero-interest money
as the area under the interest-elastic money demand curve. More recently, Alvarez and
Lippi (2009) computed welfare cost estimates in a dynamic stochastic model with a CIA
constraint and inventory management, and Alvarez, Lippi, and Robatto (2019) showed
the Baily approach still is appropriate in a wide range of modern inventory theoretic
models. However, few studies of money demand consider the eects of payment choice
on welfare, so this subsection explores these eects in detail.
7.3.1 Holding costs with instrument choice
Another key result is the magnitude of the estimated cost of holding cash (R̂ = .0049),
which includes the interest elasticity of cash demand among other factors. As holding
costs increase, consumers should hold lower cash balances and make more withdrawals,
thereby incurring more costs that are pure deadweight loss. However, in a model with non-
cash means of payment consumers have an additional margin of response to changes in
holding costssubstituting card payments for cashthat may have welfare implications.
To gauge the importance of substitution among payment instruments, we simulated the
estimated model for dierent values of the cash holding cost. Because R is a utility
parameter, not the interest rate on an alternative asset, we do not know how much R
would change if ination rose one percentage point. Thus, we varied R by about half the
estimated value and calculated implied elasticities.
The simulation results in Table 6 reveal the sensitivity of cash management to changes
in the holding cost of cash.25 A 50-percent decrease in the holding cost (.0049 to .0025)
would raise cash holdings before a transaction about 44 percent ($25.49 to $36.59). This
25The reported gures are averages from simulating the choices of 2,000 consumers, who each start
with zero cash, for 7,200 periods.
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result implies a holding-cost elasticity of demand for cash of −.85, larger in absolute value
than the prediction of −0.5 in the basic Baumol-Tobin model. Analogous elasticities for
cash holdings before withdrawals and for withdrawal amounts are roughly similar. Table 6
also reveals a non-trivial asymmetry. A roughly 50-percent increase in holdings costs
(.0049 to .0075) causes cash holdings before a transaction to decline about 24 percent
($25.49 to $19.47), an elasticity of −.44. The probability of making a withdrawal only
falls about one-half of 1 percentage point.
Cash holdings before Withdrawal Cash use Cash Payment
R transaction withdrawal amount probability share costs utility
.0025 36.59 15.57 43.94 .049 .35 26.5 465.5
.0030 33.36 14.01 40.48 .051 .34 28.7 464.1
.0035 30.76 13.21 37.25 .053 .33 30.4 462.7
.0040 28.31 11.28 36.22 .052 .33 31.8 461.1
.0045 26.50 11.03 33.23 .055 .32 33.2 459.9
.0049 25.49 10.68 31.90 .056 .32 34.6 459.0
.0055 23.58 9.69 29.71 .058 .31 35.9 457.4
.0060 22.71 9.43 28.77 .058 .31 37.2 456.5
.0065 21.33 8.65 27.68 .058 .30 37.6 454.5
.0070 20.04 8.23 26.14 .059 .30 38.2 453.0
.0075 19.47 7.79 25.77 .059 .30 39.5 452.4
Table 6: Cash management with dierent cash holding costs
The estimated model exhibits a novel sensitivity of payment choices to holding costs
that diers from inventory theoretic models that assume no change in the cash share
of payments. The decrease in holding costs induces a modest increase in the share of
transactions made with cash from .32 to .35, or about 9 percent, an elasticity of −.2.
Given the results in Figure 6, the magnitude of changes in cash holdings and cash share
recorded in Table 6 would lead to non-trivial changes in the probabilities of choosing cash.
These results reveal that cash holdings are more responsive to R than what standard
inventory-theoretic models would predict. Table 6 shows that unless one can directly
control for cash spending, estimates of the interest elasticity of cash demand will confound
two eects: 1) a change in cash spending, and 2) a change in cash holdings to nance
a constant stream of cash spending. Because there is little reason to believe that cash
spending remains constant over time when alternative payment methods emerge, there
is no reason to believe that the estimated interest elasticity of cash demand should stay
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constant over time either.
A reduction in holding costs ambiguously improves consumer welfare, dened as
payment utility net of cash management costs, for two reasons. Total cash manage-
ment costs decline (8.1 units of utility), naturally, in part due to a slight decline in the
probability of withdrawal. At the same time, payment utility rises by almost the same
amount in absolute terms as the reduction in costs (6.5 units of utility) as consumers take
advantage of more cash payments. Cash costs fall much more in percentage terms (23.4
percent) than utility rises (1.4 percent), but the absolute changes in utility are similar
and the change in net utility is small. In any case, these additional changes in consumer
welfare due to changes in payment choices has been missing from previous research on
the demand for money.
7.3.2 Withdrawal costs and technological change
As noted in Section 2, the literature widely acknowledges that considerable improvements
in technology such as ATM networks and cash back withdrawals from retail stores have
reduced the costs of cash management signicantly. To measure the eects of technolog-
ical change in our model, we ran counter-factual simulations with variation in the lower
bound of the cash withdrawal cost from the estimated value (b̂L = .0003) to the midpoint
of the estimated range (bL = 4) and compared the models' predicted changes in cash
management.
Reducing the lower bound of withdrawal costs aects withdrawals notably more than
cash holdings or use, as shown in Table 7. The probability of a withdrawal more than
doubles (.023 to .056) and the withdrawal amount nearly falls by half ($61 to $32).
But cash holdings before a transaction decline less than 20 percent and the cash share
only rises 4 percentage points (.28 to .32). As with holding costs, a reduction in cash
withdrawal costs make consumers unequivocally better o. These changes primarily
impact cash management costs, which fall by one-third (53.2 to 34.6), whereas payment
utility rises by just over 1 percent. Collectively, these economically signicant changes
provide a quantitative guide to the potential eects of recent technological changes.
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Cash holdings before Withdrawal Cash use Cash Payment
bL transaction withdrawal amount probability share costs utility
.0003 25.49 10.68 31.90 .056 .32 34.6 459.0
1 26.49 6.49 43.56 .038 .31 41.3 457.2
2 27.73 5.12 50.66 .031 .30 46.3 456.0
4 29.04 3.56 60.71 .023 .28 53.2 453.1
Table 7: Cash management with dierent withdrawal costs
Distribution of simulated withdrawal costs























Figure 8: Distribution of simulated withdrawal costs
The estimated costs of withdrawal suggest that the scope for additional cost-saving
technology in cash withdrawals going forward may be modest. The full distribution of
simulated costs reveals that most are close to zero, as shown in Figure 8, with the me-
dian b̂ = .58 <
¯̂
b = .75. Some withdrawals are made at high cost, and these might
benet from further technological changes. But the distribution of withdrawal costs de-
cays rapidly from the lower bound because consumers already strategically make most of
their withdrawals at the plentiful number of relatively favorable (low-cost) opportunities
available to them.
7.3.3 Value of payment instruments
The emergence of electronic means of payment, including credit and debit cards, has
coincided with growing anti-cash sentiment. A leading opponent is Rogo (2016), who
describes cash as a curse because it aids crime and tax evasion, and constrains monetary
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policy by inhibiting negative interest rates. Evidence on the consumer welfare of cash
relative to other payment instruments is limited and varied, however. Alvarez and Lippi
(2017) estimated that eliminating cash altogether and forcing consumers to pay with
credit would cost a mere $2 per year, but Alvarez and Argente (2019) nd that Uber
customers who prefer cash (disproportionately lower income) suer an average loss of
50 percent of the ride value when they have to use payment cards. Fulford and Schuh
(2017) estimated the value of credit card payments is 0.3 percent of annual consumption
for convenience users (no high-interest debt). Koulayev et al. (2016) estimated that
consumer welfare declines 1-3 percent in response either to a per-transaction fee of 3.6
cents for debit cards or to surcharging credit card payments that oset the merchant
discount fee. And consumers lose utility when they prefer cash but it is not accepted for
payment, of course.26
To measure consumer welfare associated with payment instruments, we simulated the
estimated model under dierent counter-factual scenarios with exclusion of instruments
(equivalently, non-acceptance). Table 8 reports simulation results for cash management
decisions and consumer utility in each scenario. For reference, the rst row repeats the
estimation results of the full model with all instruments. See Appendix A for details of
modications made to the model for the counterfactual simulations.
Eliminating any single payment instrument would entail much larger welfare declines
than previous simulations. Elimination of debit cards is the most welfare-reducing, as
payment utility would be 22 percent lower and cash management costs would more than
triple. Eliminating cash would entail an even larger reduction in payment utility (27
percent), but cash management and related costs would disappear so consumer welfare
would be slightly higher than without debit cards. Eliminating credit cards is the least
welfare-reducing counterfactual, as payment utility falls less than eliminating cash or debit
cards, but cash costs increase less than eliminating debit cards. In every case, welfare
declines by about an order of magnitude more than in the counterfactual simulations of
26None of these studies provides a comprehensive general equilibrium analysis of social welfare, which
requires incorporating a market for revolving credit, details of bank and non-bank payment services, and
the fee structure of the two-sided credit card markets.
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Cash holdings before Withdrawal Cash use Cash Payment
Model transaction withdrawal amount probability share costs utility
Full 25.49 10.68 31.9 .056 .32 16.6 459.0
No cash 0 0 0 0 0 0 336.1
No debit 36.52 15.42 45.3 .072 .47 52.0 357.8
No credit 29.60 12.66 36.8 .063 .37 40.8 401.3
No cards 123.95 55.42 162.1 .177 1.00 219.4 -76.7
Table 8: Cash management with counterfactual payment instruments
changes in cash costs. Note that eliminating just one of the payment cards would not alter
dramatically the cash landscape, however. Withdrawal probabilities and cash holdings
would be modestly higher, and the cash share would be 5 to 15 percentage points higher;
these eects are slightly greater for debit cards.
Eliminating both payment cards would make consumers markedly worse o and entail
much larger increases in cash activity. Payment utility would decline 117 percent and
the cost of cash managment would rise more than 1,300 percent. The probability of cash
withdrawals would more than triple to nearly one in ve payments being preceded by
a withdrawal instead of one in 26. Cash holdings before a transaction would increase
roughly ve-fold to $124. For perspective on the last outcome, note that Briglevics and
Schuh (2013) reports consumers holding $110 (ination-adjusted to 2010 dollars) in the
mid-1980s.27 At that time, debit cards had not fully diused yet and credit cards were
not used as widely for smaller value payments, so the counterfactual simulation provides
a reasonable comparison with actual cash holdings between the two periods.
8 Conclusions
This paper demonstrates that daily transactions-level data on cash demand and payment
use from diary surveys can be used successfully to estimate a dynamic optimizing model
blending modern elements of cash inventory managment and payment choice. The es-
timated model shows cash demand and payment use are jointly determined, inuencing
each other in economically meaningful ways. Two important insights for consumer wel-
27See their Table 1 based on the Survey of Currency and Transactions Account Usage conducted by
the Federal Reserve Board in 1984 and 1986.
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fare are: 1) the level of utility from optimal payment choices is much larger than utility
lost from cash management costs; and 2) changes in economic conditions aecting cash
management or payment opportunities produce roughly similar magnitudes of change in
utility from payment choices and cash costs. Together, the results motivate the need for
future research that builds on the blended model.
Relaxing the model's theoretical restrictions on consumers' payment planning is an
important direction. Endogenizing the number and value of payments (expenditures),
planning more than one payment into the future, allowing for bill payments, and intro-
ducing shopping time and trips with multiple payments all could lead to broader and
deeper insights. Exploring heterogeneity in cash withdrawal opportunities and manage-
ment of new payment technologies would enhance understanding as well. Introducing
merchant acceptance of payments (as in Hunyh, Nicholls, and Shcherbakov 2019, for ex-
ample) is essential for capturing demand and supply eects in general equilibrium. More
generally, integration of the process of search, exchange, and settlement of transactions
that is central to New Monetarist models (as in Chiu and Molico 2010, for example) is a
natural direction to extend our framework.
Although impressive and valuable, the new payments diary data merit further de-
velopment that would enable vital enhancements to the theoretical model. Over time,
simply having more data will eventually make it feasible to incorporate variation in the
precise costs of withdrawals across locations. But extensions and improvements to the
data also are needed. Perhaps most importantly, the balances of non-cash assets and
liabilitiesespecially money in checking or other payment accounts plus credit limits
and revolving debt from credit card accountsare essential for completely characteriz-
ing CIAmore generally, liquidity in advance (LIA)constraints that aect the linkage
between portfolio management and settlement of payment for consumer expenditures en-
visioned by Samphantharak, Schuh, and Townsend (2018). More details about the nature
of asset and liability accounts, such as the costs and benets of specic credit cards, and
tracking of the exact payment card or instrument used (instead of a simple category like
credit card) would allow useful enhancements of the theoretical specication of payment
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utility. Accurately measuring merchant acceptance for each payment opportunity also is
essential to relaxing the assumption that sellers accept every payment instrument.
The estimated model's characterization of consumer welfare eects from completely
restricting payment instrument use (or acceptance) provides a step toward the evalua-
tion of social welfare and optimal public policies related to currency and other payment
systems. However, it is not yet sucient for comprehensive assessments of the many
important policy issues of the day. For example, the future of physical currency in an
electronic world that has spawned the re-emergence of private currencies like Bitcoin
remains uncertain. And neither regulation of payment card interchange fees, such as
Federal Reserve Regulation II, nor provision of payment services with faster or real-time
settlement, such as the Federal Reserve's FedNowSM Service, have been evaluated with
an economically adequate specication of consumer demand for money and payments.28
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Appendix A Counterfactual Models
For clarity, we briey spell out the models used in the counterfactual simulations. The
simplest cases are the models with cash and one type of payment card. These models
retain the structure of the benchmark model (described by equations (1) and (2)), but
the payment instrument choice equation (1) only includes either debit or credit cards.
Formally, either i ∈ {h, c} or i ∈ {h, d}.
A.1 No cash
In these simulations consumers choose between credit and debit cards at the point of sale.
The model collapses to a sequence of logit models, with a value function of
V (p) = max
i∈{d,h}
ui(p) + ε(i) + βE [V (p′)] . (3)
Since the only endogenous state variable in the benchmark model was cash holdings,
decisions made in the current choice situation have no eect on subsequent transactions.
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A.2 No cards
The counterfactual model is an extension of the BaumolTobin model with stochastic
transaction values and withdrawal costs. Consumers choose withdrawal policies to solve
W (m; p, b) = max−b · I(m∗ 6= m)−R ·m∗ + βE [W (m∗ − p; p′, b′)]
m∗ ≥ m, m∗ ≥ p.
After observing the value of their next transaction, p, and the withdrawal cost, b, consumers
decide whether to adjust their cash holdings. Then they make a cash payment (only
choice) and move on to another withdrawal decision before their next transaction. With-
out payment cards, consumers must always have enough cash to pay for the current
transaction, p.
The counter-factual model uses the same withdrawal and holding costs as in Table 5,
but no utility from card payments. Timing in the counter-factual model also is the same.
Thus, consumers know with certainty the amount of their next transaction and are not
forced to hold precautionary balances to accommodate the low-probability occurrence of
very large-value transactions as in Alvarez and Lippi (2013), which are much less likely
for retail payments.
Appendix B Data Appendix
This appendix provides additional details about the Survey (SCPC) and Diary (DCPC)
of Consumer Payment Choice and their data. Originally, the SCPC and DCPC were pro-
duced by the Federal Reserve Bank of Boston but these data programs are now managed
by the Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta. Data, questionnaires, and associated data re-
ports for each year and survey can be obtained from the Atlanta Fed's consumer payment
website.29 For specic details about the 2012 SCPC and DCPC, see Schuh and Stavins





The SCPC is a 30-minute online questionnaire based on respondent recall that is admin-
istered annually each fall beginning in 2008. In most cases, respondents completed the
2012 SCPC at least one day before the DCPC, although the lag may be up to several
weeks. SCPC respondents received $20 incentive compensation for completing the survey.
The SCPC is taken rst and responses are used to tailor the design of the DCPC for each
respondent's adoption patterns.
The DCPC is a 20-minute mixed-mode diary survey that was administered for the
rst time in October 2012. For three consecutive days, respondents were asked to record
all payment and cash management transactions in a physical memory aid. Each night,
respondents also completed an online survey to report their cash holdings (including
denominations) and the transactions recorded in their memory aid, and to answer follow-
up questions about the transactions. If they completed the SCPC, DCPC respondents
also received additional incentive compensation of $60 for completing all three diary days.
The survey instruments primarily are designed to track payment and cash manage-
ment activity for nine common instruments: cash, checks (personal, certied, or cashier's),
money orders, traveler's checks, debit cards (also ATM cards), credit cards, prepaid
cards, online banking bill payment and bank account number payment.30 The SCPC
also measures consumer adoption of bank accounts that are associated with the payment
instruments: checking, saving, credit card, and prepaid card (some of which may be
managed by non-banks).
Performance of the survey instruments was relatively good in all dimensions. Item
response rates for most survey questions were well above 90 percent. Both survey
instruments included real-time error checking methods, and respondents had access to
RAND sta for technical and conceptual assistance. The vast majority of respondents
rated their interest in both surveys as 4 or 5 on a ve-point Likert scale (5 being most
interesting).
30Newer payment instruments such as text/SMS (Venmo and Zelle) and cryptocurrencies (bitcoin) are
not included. Applications like PayPal or ApplePay are not payment instruments per se but use them
to process payments in ways that compete with traditional banking services.
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B.2 Sampling Methodology
Respondents in the 2012 SCPC and DCPC were selected from the RAND Corpora-
tion's American Life Panel (ALP).31 Currently, the ALP is a nationally representative,
probability-based panel of more than 6,000 participants who are regularly interviewed
over the internet. In 2012, however, the ALP was in the process of transitioning from
a convenience sample to nationally representative over multiple years. Consequently, the
2012 SCPC and DCPC subsamples of the ALP were randomly re-selected using standard
methods to match the U.S. population characterized by the Current Population Survey.
The matched 2012 SCPC-DCPC sample included 2,468 respondents who completed all
three days of the DCPC. The participation rate of respondents selected for the survey and
diary participation was nearly 100 percent. Hitczenko (2015) and Angrisani, Foster, and
Hitczenko (2014) provide details of the joint sampling methodology for the 2012 survey
instruments.
The primary reporting unit in the ALP is a consumer rather than household. Sam-
pling consumers is easier and less expensive than surveying all members of a household.
Consumer-based sampling also is likely to produce better estimates of individual payment
choices, especially for currency where the head of household may not track all activity.
Sampling consumers could lead to mismeasurement of other aspects of payments, like
joint bank accounts and shared household bills like utilities. However, proper random
selection of consumers should yield a sample that is representative of U.S. households
and produces unbiased aggregate U.S. estimates.32 A separate quarterly survey provides
a wide array of time series demographic characteristics for each ALP consumer that can
be merged with the SCPC and DCPC.
31See https://www.rand.org/research/data/alp.html.
32In 2012, the convenience sample nature of the ALP produced around 100 households with two co-




The SCPC and DCPC were jointly implemented with a common sample of respondents.
Starting in September, the SCPC was implemented rst and completed prior to the
DCPC. In most cases, respondents completed their SCPC at least one day prior to their
DCPC. In some cases, the delay may have been a month or so, which could have had
minor eects on the synchronization of responses between survey instruments related to
adoption of accounts or payment instruments.
Respondents who completed their SCPC were randomly assigned to start their con-
sectutive three-day diaries from September 29 through October 31, with the last diaries
being completed on November 2. Each wave of more than 200 DCPC respondents also
was randomly selected to be representative of U.S. consumers and staggered across the
month so that each day had (in expectation) an equal share of respondents who were
completing days one, two, and three of the diary. This procedure is designed to smooth
any possible eects of diary fatigue that might lead to incomplete diaries or reduced re-
sponse quality during a diary period and requires burn in (September 29-30) and cool
down (November 1-2) periods from which the data are not used.
The resulting DCPC data form a balanced longitudinal panel for October 1-31 with
xed entry and exit predetermined by the sampling design and diary methodology. To-
gether, the sampling methodology and survey design make the DCPC sample represen-
tative of U.S. consumers for each day of the month and for the entire month. However,
the data for individual consumers only extend three days and may not be representative
of the individual consumer's monthly payment and cash management behavior. Thus,
individual consumer data cannot be projected to the full month.
B.4 Data Measurement
The primary input for this paper is the DCPC transactions-level data on payments and
cash management. For payments, the DCPC measures the following seven items: 1)
exact time of day (hour, minute, and a.m. or p.m.); 2) the payment value (dollars and
cents); 3) the payment instrument; 4) the location (in-person or not); 5) the device used
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(computer, mobile phone, etc. or none); 6) payment type (retail, person-to-person, or
bill); and 7) the merchant type (payee). The SCPC measures payment use as the number
of payments per month made (volume), which is measured implicitly in the DCPC as
the recorded number of payments per day. However, we do not use the SCPC payment
volume data because they rely on respondent recall, hence more susceptible to potential
measurement error, and do not include dollar values.33
For cash management, the DCPC measures cash holdings (stock) and other cash-
related activities (ows). Every night, respondents record the total dollar values of cur-
rency held in their pocket, purse, or wallet by denomination (the number and value of
$1 bills, $5 bills, etc.) but excluding coins. Every day, respondents record the number
and dollar values of cash withdrawals by location, cash deposits, and other aspects of
cash-related transactions such as conversion of coins to notes.
The 2012 DCPC did not collect stock and ow data on other assets or liabilities,
such as bank checking and credit card accounts. The 2012 DCPC collected data on re-
loadings of prepaid cards, which are quite similar to cash, but did not collect the balances
and withdrawals of specic prepaid cards. Subsequent DCPC's have collected data on
balances in primary checking accounts only. However, these data are insucient to track
the cash ow of demand deposits if there are multiple accounts, joint account holders, or
other complexities in household management of checking account stocks and ows.
B.5 Data Cleaning
For every consumer and every day, the DCPC data should measure exactly the following
cash-ow identity:
cash tonight = cash last night + withdrawals  (deposits + cash payments).
In practice, however, there is potential error in this measurement. To minimize the
potential measurement error, the online diary survey uses this exact accounting cash-ow
33Despite relying on recall, the SCPC data on payment use are surprisingly close to the DCPC estimates
except for cash, where the DCPC estimates are signicantly higher perhaps due to better tracking.
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identity and other techniques for real-time error checking and data correction to ensure
that the daily cash-ow identity holds. More than 70 percent of daily consumer-level
cash-ow identies held within a rounding error ($1 per transaction allowing for coins).
When individual consumer-day cash-ow identities did not hold, we cleaned the mi-
cro data following methods used in other consumer or household surveys that collect
dynamic cash data, such as the Townsend-Thai Monthly Survey (see Samphantharak
and Townsend 2009). When cash-ow errors were negative, suggesting that respondents
spent more cash (or made more deposits) during the day than they recorded, we increased
their end-of-day cash holdings suciently to eliminate negative cash-ow entries. One
explanation for these negative errors is that respondents used cash stored in their home
or elsewhere, which was not collected in the 2012 DCPC but is estimated in the SCPC
to be much larger than cash in wallet. Measurement errors also may have occurred in
reporting of the cash stocks or withdrawals but positive cash-ow errors are smaller and
less common. In any case, we trusted respondent reporting of cash management and
adjusted end-of-day cash holdings whenever the cash-ow identity was violated.
In the few cases where cash was used to pay bills (which were excluded from the
sample), we adjusted the respondent's cash holdings by subtracting the amount of the
bill so our measure of cash holdings reects only cash balances held for making POS
transactions. This procedure is not entirely innocuous. For example, consumers who
make a large bill payment with cash may make a withdrawal beforehand, in which case
they might withdraw cash to cover POS expenses as well. However, our estimation
sample has only ve instances where a cash bill payment is preceded by a withdrawal
that is larger than the amount of the bill payment, so this restriction is unlikely to
inuence our results. In any case, bill payments often involve dierent means of payment
(online banking, bank account number payment) that are unavailable at the point of
sale and likely entail dierent decision making than POS payments such as planning and
budgeting at monthly or annual frequencies. Sexton (2015) also argues that bill payments
involve aspects of behavioral economics.
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